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IN DEFENSE OF DISPARATE IMPACT: 
AN OPPORTUNITY TO REALIZE THE PROMISE OF THE 
FAIR HOUSING ACT 
 
Valerie Schneider* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Twice in the past three years, the Supreme Court has granted 
certiorari in Fair Housing cases, and, each time, under pressure from civil 
rights leaders who feared that the Supreme Court might narrow current 
Fair Housing Act jurisprudence, the cases settled just weeks before oral 
argument.  Settlements after the Supreme Court grants certiorari are 
extremely rare, and, in these cases, the settlements reflect a substantial fear 
among civil rights advocates that the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in 
cases such as Shelby County v. Holder and Fisher v. University of Texas 
are working to dismantle many of the protections of the Civil Rights 
legislation of the 1960s. The sole issue in both of the recently settled Fair 
Housing Act cases was whether disparate impact analysis – a type of 
analysis that some on the Supreme Court may view as requiring racial 
preferences – is valid under the Fair Housing Act.  
 
This article argues that in order to have a chance at achieving the 
goal of its sponsors – “to replace the ghettos [with] truly integrated and 
balanced living patterns,” – the Fair Housing Act cannot just take aim at 
the aberrant individual who intentionally denies a person housing because 
of his or her race.  Instead, the Fair Housing Act must recognize claims 
based on disparate impact analysis alone.  This article argues that 
disparate impact analysis is especially needed to address urban 
redevelopment decisions because such decisions are often made through a 
multi-party protracted process, in which a discriminatory intent may be 
impossible to discern or entirely absent.  Additionally, it is the outcome of 
large-scale urban redevelopment projects that will truly shape racial 
housing patterns in the twenty-first century. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
“[T]he arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as 
disastrous and unfair to private rights and the public 
interest as the perversity of a willful scheme.”1 
 
In the past few Supreme Court terms, the Supreme Court has 
seemed inclined to tighten its grip on anything it deems a “racial 
preference.”  In the 2012-2013 term alone, the Supreme Court stripped the 
Voting Rights Act of its main enforcement mechanism and narrowed its 
acceptance of affirmative action programs.2  It appears that the Supreme 
Court is now hoping to limit the existing interpretation of another one of the 
main pillars of the Civil Rights era—the Fair Housing Act. 
  Twice in the past three years the Supreme Court has granted 
certiorari in Fair Housing cases, and, each time, under pressure from civil 
rights leaders who feared that the Supreme Court might narrow current Fair 
Housing Act jurisprudence, the cases settled weeks before oral argument.3  
                                                 
1
 United States v. City of Black Jack, Mo., 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974) 
(quoting Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967)).  
2
 Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013) and Fisher v. University of Texas, 
113 S.Ct. 2411 (2013) 
3
 See Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mt. Holly, 658 F.3d 375 
(3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3689 (U.S. June 17, 2013) (No.11–1507); 
Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3280 (U.S. 
Nov. 7, 2011) (No. 10–1032).  For information related to the concern among civil rights 
leaders that the Supreme Court is intent on limiting disparate impact analysis, see Joan 
Biskupic, Analysis: Rights Groups Try to Avoid U.S. High Court Setback, REUTERS (Mar. 
2, 2012, 12:23 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/02/us-usa-court-civil-rights-
idUSTRE82117X20120302 (“Civil rights advocates took extraordinary steps over the last 
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The sole issue in both of these cases was whether disparate impact analysis 
– a type of analysis that some on the court may view as requiring racial 
preferences – is valid under the Fair Housing Act. 
This article argues that preserving disparate impact analysis is 
critical to ensuring that the Fair Housing Act has a chance to fulfill its 
mission of decreasing housing segregation, increasing housing opportunities 
for minorities and ending housing discrimination.  Furthermore, I argue that 
the facts of many modern housing discrimination cases, particularly in the 
urban redevelopment context, are particularly appropriate for disparate 
impact analysis.  In urban redevelopment cases, racially disparate and 
segregation-increasing impacts often flow not from a single decision-maker 
intent on treating minorities differently (which could be addressed by 
disparate treatment analysis), but from a diffuse system in which intent is 
not relevant to an inquiry into whether the principles of the Fair Housing 
Act have been upheld. 
                                                                                                                            
three months to persuade the city of St. Paul, Minn., to withdraw a fair-housing case the 
U.S. Supreme Court had already agreed to hear, reflecting their expressed fears about the 
court under Chief Justice John Roberts.”); see Emily Gurnon, St. Paul Withdraws U.S. 
Supreme Court Petition in Housing Discrimination Case, PIONEER PRESS (Feb. 10, 2012, 
5:33 PM), http://www.twincities.com/ci_19938569; see also Adam Liptak, Housing Case 
Is Settled Before It Goes to Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2013, at A18, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/14/us/fair-housing-case-is-settled-before-it-reaches-
supreme-court.html?_r=0; see also David O’Reilly, Mount Holly Gardens Discrimination 
Dispute Settled, PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov. 15, 2013), http://articles.philly.com/2013-11-
15/news/44078231_1_township-residents-olga-pomar-south-jersey-legal-services; Valerie 
Schneider, Settlement in Fair Housing Case --A Sigh of Relief, ACSBLOG (Nov. 14, 2013), 
http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/settlement-in-fair-housing-case-a-sigh-of-relief.   
 IN DEFENSE OF DISPARATE IMPACT 5 
The Supreme Court’s apparent interest in limiting the use of 
disparate impact analysis in Fair Housing cases is a recent phenomenon.4  
Since the enactment of the Fair Housing Act forty-five years ago, Fair 
Housing jurisprudence, which is modeled in large part on employment 
discrimination jurisprudence, has treated disparate impact analysis as a 
given—the eleven circuits that have confronted the issue have all assumed 
or decided that suits based on harms that have a disparate impact on 
members of a protected class are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act, 
regardless of whether those perpetrating the harms had a discriminatory 
intent.5  
                                                 
4
 Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having any Impact? An Appellate 
Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims under the Fair Housing Act, 63 AM. U. 
L. REV. ___ (2013)  
5
 See United States v. City of Black Jack, Mo., 508 F.2d 1179, 1184–85 (8th Cir. 
1974); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th 
Cir. 1977) [hereinafter Arlington Heights II]; Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 
126, 146 (3d Cir. 1977); Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1311 (9th Cir. 1982); 
Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682, F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. 
Marengo Cnty. Comm’n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1559 n.20 (11th Cir. 1984); Arthur v. City of 
Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 574–75 (6th Cir. 1986); Hanson v. Veterans Admin., 800 F.2d 1381, 
1386 (5th Cir. 1986); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 
935 (2d Cir. 1988); Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev. 
56 F.3d 1243, 1250–51 (10th Cir. 1995); Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 
49 (1st Cir. 2000); see also Sherman Ave. Tenants’ Ass’n. v. District of Columbia, 444 
F.3d 673, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“[E]very one of the eleven circuits to have considered the 
issue has held that the Fair Housing Act . . . prohibits not only intentional housing 
discrimination, but also housing actions having a disparate impact.”).  White it is true that 
the eleven circuits that have confronted a disparate impact challenge have decided or 
assumed that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act, I note 
that, in Arlington Heights II, the 7th Circuit suggested that some finding of intent might be 
required.  That said, as explained in Section V of this article, HUD recently promulgated a 
regulation formalizing the burden-shifting approach. Under the rule, the burden-shifting 
approach is as follows: “(1) the charging party first bears the burden of proving its prima 
facie case of either disparate impact or perpetuation of segregation; (2) then the burden 
shifts to the defendant to prove that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or 
6 IN DEFENSE OF DISPARATE IMPACT  
This article seeks to understand Supreme Court’s recent interest in 
limiting the use of disparate impact analysis in Fair Housing cases, and it 
argues that, without disparate impact analysis, there is little hope that the 
Fair Housing Act will be able to nudge our society in the direction of less 
segregated living patterns and more housing opportunities for minorities. 
The first section of this article describes the story behind the most 
recent disparate impact case that made its way to the Supreme Court and 
was settled just weeks before argument:  Township of Mt. Holly v. Mt. Holly 
Gardens Citizens In Action, Inc.  Additionally, Section I provides historical 
context regarding passage of the Fair Housing Act and the progression of 
Fair Housing jurisprudence. 
In the second section, I confront textualists who insist that, because 
the Fair Housing Act does not contain the magic word “affect,” it is 
unconcerned with acts that disproportionately burden members of protected 
classes.  In this section, I dissect the text of the Fair Housing Act to 
demonstrate that its language supports disparate impact analysis like its 
cousins, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) (both of which have been held 
to support disparate impact claims by the Supreme Court and the first of 
                                                                                                                            
more of its legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests; and (3) if the defendant satisfies its 
burden, the charging party may still establish liability by demonstrating that the substantial, 
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which was amended to explicitly include such claims). 
The third section of this article turns to scholarship that suggests that 
the disparate impact theory is simply a way to show intentional 
discrimination through circumstantial or indirect evidence6—i.e. if you 
cannot prove discriminatory intent by showing that a housing provider 
made racist comments, maybe discriminatory intent can be inferred by 
looking at evidence that a policy has a disproportionate impact on 
minorities.7  Here I argue that, while evidence of disparate impact can 
certainly strengthen an intentional discrimination claim, a claim based on 
unintentional discrimination can also stand on its own under the Fair 
Housing Act.   
The fourth section contains the meat of this article.  It examines the 
manner in which municipalities actually make housing-related 
                                                                                                                            
legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests could be served by a practice that has a less 
discriminatory effect.  24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2013). 
6
 See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 
701, 706 (2006) (arguing that the development of disparate impact theory in the 
employment discrimination context had the perverse effect of truncating the development 
of intentional discrimination jurisprudence); 
7See Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th 
Cir. 1977) (holding that under some circumstances a violation of the FHA can be 
established by showing discriminatory effect without showing enough discriminatory intent 
as required in Equal Protection jurisprudence after Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 
(1976)); see generally Selmi, supra note 6.   According to Arlington Heights II four factors 
should be considered when there is not a strong showing of discriminatory intent: (1) the 
strength in plaintiff’s showing of discriminatory effect; (2) evidence of discriminatory 
intent, “though not enough to satisfy the constitutional standard of Washington v. Davis”; 
(3) the defendant’s interest in taking the action that produced the discriminatory impact; (4) 
whether the plaintiff seeks “to compel the defendant from interfering with individual 
property owners who wish to provide such housing.”  Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 
8 IN DEFENSE OF DISPARATE IMPACT  
redevelopment decisions.  I posit that, because of the diffuse and non-linear 
manner in which housing-related decisions are made, particularly in the 
context of so-called “urban redevelopment” projects, intent to discriminate 
may never be found (and, indeed, may not exist), even where there is a clear 
discriminatory impact which undermines the purpose of the Fair Housing 
Act.  For the Fair Housing Act to have a legitimate role in nudging our 
society closer to equality in housing opportunities across racial lines, 
redevelopment decisions must be subject to disparate impact analysis.   
In the final section of this article, I examine common concerns about 
disparate impact jurisprudence and propose some methods for addressing 
such concerns. 
 
I.  THE STORY BEHIND THE STORY 
 
A.  Mt. Holly, New Jersey 
 
 
The human story behind the most recent disparate impact case that 
settled shortly before the Supreme Court was to hear oral arguments - 
Township of Mt. Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens In Action, Inc. – 
highlights the ways in which, in the urban redevelopment context, intent to 
discriminate may be irrelevant to an inquiry into whether the principles of 
the Fair Housing Act have been upheld.   
                                                                                                                            
1290.   
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The plaintiffs in Mt. Holly were former and current residents of 
Mount Holly Gardens (the “Gardens”), a subdivision in Mount Holly 
Township, New Jersey (the “Township”), who sued the Township in an 
effort to block redevelopment plans.  Those redevelopment plans called for 
the complete demolition of all existing homes in the Gardens community in 
order to make way for a new residential development, the prices of which 
would be out of reach for almost all of the Gardens current and former 
residents—essentially, the planned development would have wiped the one 
majority-minority community in the Township off the map, scattering its 
minority residents to even more segregated communities.8 
The Gardens was originally constructed in the 1950s to house 
military families, and it consisted of approximately 325 two-story brick row 
houses.  By the 1970s, the neighborhood suffered from many of the 
problems associated with underserved and poor communities—population 
growth stressed the infrastructure of the neighborhood and crime rates rose 
                                                 
8
 Brief in Opposition for Mt. Holly Gardens Respondents at 1, 8, Twp. of Mount Holly 
v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, No. 11-1507 (Sept. 11, 2012) (“The court below 
observed that the Township was purchasing Gardens homes for $32,000 to $49,000 and 
that ‘[t]he estimated cost of a new home in the development was between $200,000 and 
$275,000, well outside the range of affordability for a significant portion of the African-
American and Hispanic residents of the Township.’”).  The relocation-assistance plan was 
“woefully inadequate” and had the effect of displacing Gardens residents from the 
neighborhood.  The plan capped the amount of assistance at a maximum amount “far lower 
than the estimated cost of a new home in the Villages at Parker’s Mill.”  Brief for Mt. 
Holly Gardens Respondents at 11, Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly gardens Citizens in 
Action, Inc., No. 11-1507 (Oct. 21, 2013) (“Given the ‘severe shortage of affordable 
housing’ in Burlington County, many Gardens renters reported being unable to find 
affordable housing elsewhere in the Township . . . [a]nd more than two-thirds of renters 
10 IN DEFENSE OF DISPARATE IMPACT  
steadily.9  In response to these circumstances, members of the tightknit 
neighborhood came together to address challenges.  In the 1970s, for 
example, residents formed a nonprofit called “Mt. Holly Citizens in Action” 
(the named plaintiff in the Mt. Holly case), which worked with residents and 
Township officials to help address problems in the community.10  
Additionally, in the 1990s, community activists worked to revitalize the 
Gardens by rehabilitating properties and advocating for increased social 
services.  These efforts resulted in the renovation of ten homes and the 
establishment of a community-policing center.11   
Despite the improvements, the infrastructure in the community 
continued to fail while the crime rate ticked upwards.  In 2002, the 
Township commissioned a study to determine whether Gardens should be 
designated as an “area in need of redevelopment” pursuant to New Jersey’s 
redevelopment laws.12  Over the strong opposition of many Gardens 
residents, the study concluded that the entire Gardens neighborhood was 
“blighted.”13   
                                                                                                                            
who accepted Township assistance were relocated out of the Township.”). 
9
 Brief in Opposition for Mt. Holly Gardens Respondents at 4–5, Twp. of Mount Holly 
v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, No. 11-1507 (Sept. 11, 2012) (noting the increase 
in crime and noting the fact that the community suffered from severe drainage problems 
due to residents paving back yards as parking in the area became more scarce). 
10
 Id. at 4.  
11
 Id.  
12
 Id.  
13
 Id. at 5 (noting that the municipal plan used the word “blighted” to describe the 
entire community). 
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The Township adopted a redevelopment plan in 2003, which was 
amended in 2005 and 2008.  The most recent plan called for the 
construction of up to 520 townhomes and apartments, of which only fifty-
six would be designated as “affordable housing,” and of those fifty-six, only 
eleven would be offered to existing Gardens residents on a priority basis.14  
Unfortunately, for almost all of the residents of the Gardens, even the most 
“affordable” homes in the new development would be out of reach—few, if 
any, members of the existing community would be able to stay in their 
homes and benefit from the revitalization of the neighborhood. 
With a redevelopment plan in place, the Township began to 
dismantle the Gardens community.  Starting in 2002, the Township began to 
purchase homes in the Gardens at prices ranging from $32,000 to $49,000, a 
price that would do little to allow residents to relocate within Mt. Holly or 
any non-segregated nearby areas.15  Despite this, sensing that the Township 
might exercise eminent domain rights if they did not acquiesce, many 
residents and landlords took the deals offered to them and fled.  Unable to 
afford homes nearby with the money offered by the township, most former 
residents moved from the relatively diverse Township to much more 
segregated communities.  As a result, the Township became increasingly 
white while already segregated communities became even more 
                                                 
14
 Id. at 6. 
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segregated.16 
Within a few years, more than 200 homes were purchased by the 
Township and destroyed.17  Many of the homes that were demolished were 
attached to ones where residents remained, leaving broken bricks, gaps, 
leakage and drainage problems for the residents who wished to stay in their 
homes.  As of June, 2011, of the 325 original brick row houses, only 
seventy homes remained under private ownership.18      
Explaining why she did not wish to leave the Gardens 
neighborhood, one of the few remaining residents said, “When I bought the 
house, I thought I’d be here for the rest of my days.”19  Another resident 
remarked, “My children are here.  My roots are here.  My grandkids live 
around the neighborhood.  I don’t want to go nowhere.  I want to stay in 
Mount Holly.”20  The few remaining residents live among empty lots, 
destroyed homes and damaged infrastructure.21 
                                                                                                                            
15
 Id. at 8.  
16
 See Id. at 3. 
17
 Id. at 9. 
18
 Id. at 8.  
19
 Inst. for Justice, Scorched Earth: Eminent Domain Abuse in the Gardens of Mount 
Holly at 5:10, YOUTUBE (Mar. 10, 2011), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QMDnCcSUfao. 
20
 Id. at 5:20.   
21
 The Mt. Holly case is the second of two disparate impact cases for which the 
Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the past two years.  The first of the two cases—
Magner v. Gallagher—was particularly troubling to proponents of disparate impact claims 
because it was brought by an unusual and unsympathetic set of plaintiffs in the Fair 
Housing context—landlords who owned dilapidated housing.   In Gallagher, sixteen 
landlords (three of whom where non-white) sued the City of St. Paul, claiming that the 
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As noted above, the Gardens was the only neighborhood in the 
Township with predominantly African-American and Hispanic residents.  
According to the 2000 Census, of the 1,301 residents of the Gardens, 46.1% 
were African-American, 28.8% were Hispanic, and 19.7% were non-
Hispanic whites.22  The Township’s plan to destroy the Gardens and replace 
it with housing that was out of reach to its current residents meant that 
almost all of the Township’s minority residents would have to move to 
other municipalities.  The due to the redevelopment plan, the Township will 
be significantly more white, and the individuals who once lived in the 
relatively integrated Township (when looking at it as a whole), will likely 
be forced into more segregated areas.  This is exactly the problem that the 
sponsors of the Fair Housing Act sought to remedy—of course the sponsors 
                                                                                                                            
City’s aggressive enforcement of the housing code disproportionately impacted their low-
income tenants, sixty to seventy percent of whom were African American.  Per the 
landlords, the City’s enforcement of the housing code would force the landlords to either 
spend money fixing properties (a cost which would be passed to the mostly minority 
tenants) or to take properties off the market (making rental housing less available to 
minority tenants).  Though the landlords asserted that the disparate impact would harm 
their minority tenants, no tenants joined the suit.  On appeal, the Eighth Circuit found that 
that the landlords had presented a prima facie case of disparate impact.  Fair Housing 
groups vigorously opposed the petition for certiorari via amicus briefs. Even Walter 
Mondale, the Fair Housing Act’s principal sponsor, weighed in, worried that a conservative 
and business-friendly Supreme Court might find that disparate impact claims are not 
cognizable under the Fair Housing Act, which would, according to Mondale, “de-fang the 
Fair Housing Act.”  See Kevin Diaz, St. Paul Yanks Housing Fight From High Court, STAR 
TRIBUNE, Feb. 10, 2012, available at 
http://www.startribune.com/politics/national/139138084.html.  Even St. Paul’s Mayor, 
Chris Coleman, who had originally pressed the case, feared that under the facts of 
Gallagher, the Supreme Court might grant a “[p]yrrhic victory” for the City that would 
ultimately weaken the Fair Housing Act.  See Gurnon, supra note 3.  Bowing to pressure, 
the City requested dismissal of its petition in February of 2012.  See id.   
22
 Brief in Opposition for Mt. Holly Gardens Respondents at 3, Twp. of Mount Holly 
v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, No. 11–1507 (Sept. 11, 2012). 
14 IN DEFENSE OF DISPARATE IMPACT  
of the act were concerned with acts of intentional discrimination, but, as 
then Senator Walter Mondale explained, the thrust of the Fair Housing Act 
was also aimed at “replac[ing] the ghettos [with] truly integrated and 
balanced living patterns.”23 
B.  History of Residential Segregation 
 
In order to understand why disparate impact analysis is needed to 
combat racial segregation, it is important to understand the forces that lead 
to the types of racial segregation that are now pervasive in American cities 
and towns. 
When standing at a subway stop at rush hour in many American 
cities, it is often easy to determine the destination of the train by the race of 
those who board or disembark.  If one sees a white crowd boarding a redline 
train in Boston, Massachusetts, one can guess that the train is heading north 
to Cambridge, a neighboring city that is majority white.  If the crowd 
consists mostly of African Americans and other minorities, one may guess 
that the train is heading south towards Dorchester, a predominantly minority 
section of Boston.24  Similarly, if one boards a yellow line train in 
Washington, DC, one might be able to guess from the racial mix of the 
occupants whether the train is heading towards Prince Georges County (a 
                                                 
23
 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale).  
24
 See Dorchester Census Breakdown, BOSTON.COM, 
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predominately African American county in Maryland) or towards Arlington 
(a predominantly white county in Virginia).25   
The segregation pervasive in modern American cities is not the 
result only of economic disparities between races (as some assume), but 
instead stems from systematic public and private efforts to isolate racial 
minorities.  Though many urban neighborhoods were relatively racially 
integrated in the early part of the twentieth century, by the end of the 1920s, 
whites began to utilize a variety of legal tools to exclude African Americans 
from white neighborhoods.26  Restrictive covenants in deeds prohibited 
whites from selling to African Americans.27  Discriminatory zoning 
practices locked African Americans out of particular neighborhoods.28  
Discrimination in sales, rental and financing practices was widespread, and 
there were few legal tools for challenging such practices. 
In the 1930s, these tools of segregation, which had been practiced 
mostly on a local or individual level, began to be more strongly reinforced 
                                                                                                                            
http://www.boston.com/yourtown/boston/dorchester/news/census_2010/ (last visited Oct. 
28, 2013). 
25
 See Brian Patrick Larkin, Note, The Forty-Year “First Step”: The Fair Housing Act 
As an Incomplete Tool for Suburban Integration, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1617, 1617–18 
(2007) (“A typical commuter will always know which train will be next to arrive on [the 
Metro] platform by the clear racial makeup of those who are waiting—black professionals 
will be the overwhelming majority if the Green Line is about to arrive, and white 
professionals will dominate the platform if the Yellow Line is next.”). 
26
 Id.  
27
 ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION § 2:2 
(2012); see also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1948) (holding that racially 
restrictive covenants are unconstitutional).  
16 IN DEFENSE OF DISPARATE IMPACT  
by federal policies that embraced racial discrimination in federally assisted 
housing.  The housing policies of the New Deal “brought the full force of 
the federal government to the aid of institutionalized racial segregation.”29  
The Federal Housing Administration, with its new program of guaranteed 
mortgages, adopted policies that promoted, and indeed called for, racial 
discrimination.30  For example, the Federal Housing Administration’s 
guidelines for mortgage appraisals called for protection of neighborhoods 
from the “infiltration of inharmonious racial groups.”31  Additionally, an 
agency manual explained that neighborhood stability was an important 
factor to consider in underwriting policies, indicating that “[a] change in 
social or racial occupancy generally contributes to instability and a decline 
in values.”32  As homeownership became the principal way for Americans 
to build wealth, the Federal Housing Administration systematically worked 
to deny this opportunity to African Americans, resulting in a lasting wealth 
gap between African Americans and whites, which persists today.33 
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 SCHWEMM, supra note 27.   
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 Karl Taeuber, The Contemporary Context of Housing Discrimination, 6 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 339, 341 (1988).   
30
 Id.  
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 Id.  
32
 John O. Calmor, Symposium, Spatial Equality and the Kerner Commission Report: 
A Back-to-The-Future Essay, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1487, 1511 (1993) (quoting CITIZENS’ 
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A DECENT HOME: A REPORT ON THE CONTINUING FAILURE 
OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE EQUAL HOUSING OPPORTUNITY 81–82 (1983) 
(emphasis omitted)).  
33
 Brian Gilmore, Home is Where the Hatred Is: A Proposal for a Federal Housing 
Administration Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 10 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, 
GENDER & CLASS 249, 253 (2011). 
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It was not just the federal government that systematically worked to 
increase segregation in urban environments; the real estate industry whole 
heartedly endorsed the federal government’s views on racial segregation.   
Until 1950, for example, the Code of the National Board of Real Estate 
Brokers specifically enjoined its members from introducing “members of 
any race or nationality” into a neighborhood if such persons “will clearly be 
detrimental to property values.”34  Even when edited in response to pressure 
from civil rights leaders, the language was changed to thinly veil the clearly 
discriminatory intent—the post-1950 provision read “a Realtor should not 
be instrumental in introducing into a neighborhood a character or use which 
will clearly be detrimental to property values in that neighborhood.”35  The 
words “race” and “nationality” were replaced with “character” and “use,” 
but the purpose of the provision was clear. 
During the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, the reach of public and private 
segregationist policies became even broader.  Federally subsidized highway 
construction and urban renewal programs often reduced the supply of low-
cost housing, fragmented neighborhoods, and reinforced the segregated 
housing patterns.36  “Blockbusting” – a practice by which real estate agents 
facilitated white flight from neighborhoods by creating a scare that African 
                                                 
34
 Part III Article 34 of the Code of the National Board of Real Estate Brokers 
35
 In 1950, the former Part II, Article 34 became Part I, Article 5 of the Code of the 
National Board of Real Estate Brokers. 
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Americans were moving into the neighborhood – became widespread.37  
Banks increased the pace of racial isolation by “redlining” African 
American neighborhoods, refusing to lend (or offering much higher interest 
rates) in Black communities.38  In fact, from 1960 to 1970, every 
geographic region in America experienced an increase in residential 
segregation by race.39 
To understand why disparate impact analysis is needed in the urban 
redevelopment context, it is necessary to understand that the current 
conditions in most urban areas are not the result of natural migrations of 
communities or individual choice; the conditions are a direct result of 
widespread private and public policies with the explicit intent to segregate 
communities by race. 
i. Enactment of the Fair Housing Act 
 
The Fair Housing Act came late in the story of housing 
segregation—after the core civil rights acts of 1964 and 1965, after the start 
of the urban unrest of the mid 1960s, and after a National Advisory 
Commission on Civil Disorders warned that the nation was becoming two 
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 Taeuber, supra note 29.  
37
 SCHWEMM, supra note 27.  
38
 Id.  
39
 Id. (citing SCOTT MCKINNEY & ANN B. SCHNARE, TRENDS IN RESIDENTIAL 
SEGREGATION BY RACE: 1960-1980 at 13 (1986)). 
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societies, separate and unequal.40 
From the early 1960s, organizations such as the NAACP and the 
National Committee Against Discrimination initiated efforts to push a 
housing-related civil rights bill through Congress. As African American 
soldiers returned from Vietnam, and were forced into segregated veterans’ 
homes or were unable to find housing due to discrimination, the media, 
including traditionally white media outlets, began to focus on unrest related 
to housing.41  At the same time, provoked by profound discrimination, 
isolation, and frustration, protests and violence broke out in African 
American urban areas throughout the country, most notably starting with 
the Watts Riots in 1965, the Division Street Riots of 1966 and the Newark 
riots in 1967. 
As riots and protests intensified in the late 1960s, President Lyndon 
Johnson appointed Illinois governor Otto Kerner, Jr. to head a commission 
charged with developing a report on civil unrest in urban areas.  The report 
concluded that urban civil unrest in African American communities was 
caused in large part by white racism—not a surprising conclusion in 
hindsight, but at the time the report’s conclusions were revolutionary.  The 
report indicated that America was “moving towards two societies, one black 
                                                 
40
 Taeuber, supra note 29, at 342 (citing U.S. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON 
CIVIL DISORDERS REPORT (1968))  
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and one white—separate and unequal.”42  The report recommended, among 
other things, the elimination of barriers to choice in housing and the passage 
of a national and enforceable “open housing law.”43   
The Kerner Report was released on March 1, 1968, as the Senate 
was in the midst of a filibuster blocking Fair Housing legislation 
cosponsored by Senators Walter Mondale and Edward Brooke III (who was, 
at the time, the only African American member of the Senate).44  With the 
release of the Kerner Report, and with the help of Republican Everett 
Dirksen, Mondale and Brooke were able to attain a two-thirds Senate vote 
for cloture of debate and the legislation was passed by the Senate on March 
11, 1968.45 
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s assassination on April 4, 1968, served 
as a catalyst for the bill’s quick passage through the House with its essential 
provisions intact.  On April 10th, 1968 the House voted 250-172 to accept 
the Senate’s version and the next day, April 11th, 1968, President Johnson 
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 See e.g. Kentucky New Era, Pentagon Seeks to End Off-Post Housing Bias,” August 
18, 1967. 
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 NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N OF CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
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 Larkin, supra note 25, at 1623. 
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 SCHWEMM, supra note 27, § 5:2 (citing 114 CONG. REC. 5992 (1968)).   
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signed the bill into law.46 
The Fair Housing Act made it illegal to “refuse to sell or rent…or to 
refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or 
deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex or 
national origin.”47  It also made it illegal to “discriminate against any person 
in the terms, conditions or privileges of sale or rental” because of that 
person’s membership in one of the aforementioned protected classes.  
Additionally, the Fair Housing Act included provisions related to 
blockbusting, discriminatory advertising, discriminatory lending and other 
prohibited acts.48   
ii. Housing Segregation Now 
Despite the Fair Housing Act’s broad prohibition against 
discrimination in housing, forty-five years after the passage of the Fair 
Housing Act, housing patterns in the United States continue to be 
characterized by high levels of segregation.  Demographic trends in the 
early 1970s seemed to favor residential integration—African American 
income levels were rising, the rate of poverty in African American 
communities was declining, and African Americans had begun to join the 
                                                 
46
 Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 is commonly referred to, and will be 
referred to herein, as the “Fair Housing Act.”   
47
 Pub L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 83 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012)).  
Amendments in 1988 added familial status and handicap status as protected classes. 
48
 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–(f) (2012). 
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exodus of families from central cities to suburbs.49   With these trends in 
mind, and armed with the newly-enacted Fair Housing Act that prohibited 
discrimination, civil rights leaders were optimistic about increasing 
residential racial integration. 
Despite the fact that the nation seemed poised to enter a more 
integrated period in the early 1970s, census data show that from 1970 to 
2010, the overall level of residential segregation between African 
Americans and whites declined only modestly.50  By 1980, over one third of 
African Americans lived in “hyper-segregated,” communities, in which they 
were so isolated that they rarely encountered non-African Americans in any 
context (i.e. in stores, workplaces, etc.) in their neighborhoods.51  Housing 
segregation was no longer limited just who people saw in their 
neighborhoods; it also created an environment in which many African 
Americans and whites never came into contact in employment, commerce, 
schools, or many other facets of daily life.  This type of hyper-segregation 
has continued into the 21st century, with the 2010 census showing only 
modest reductions in residential segregation.52 
                                                 
49
 DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION 
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 60–61 (Harvard Univ. Press 1993). 
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 SCHWEMM, supra note 27.  
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as African Americans from residential isolation.  Id.   
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 ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION § 2:1 
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While there may have been hope when the Fair Housing Act was 
passed that lawsuits addressing individual acts of intentional discrimination 
would lead to increased integration or housing opportunities for African 
Americans, the persistent levels of segregation indicate that combatting 
isolated instances of intentional discrimination alone will not lead to a 
reduction in segregation.  As discussed in greater detail in the remainder of 
this article, more weapons are needed in the fight to increase housing 
opportunities for minorities, and among these weapons is the disparate 
impact theory. 
C.  The Development of Fair Housing Act Jurisprudence 
In order to understand why the Fair Housing Act supports disparate 
impacts claims, as argued in depth in in the remaining portions of this 
article, it is first important to understand more about the development of 
case law under the Fair Housing Act, particularly as it relates to disparate 
impact claims. 
The Supreme Court first addressed a disparate impact claim in the 
civil rights-litigation context in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,53 an 
employment discrimination case, brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.  Title VII, passed four years prior to the Fair Housing Act, 
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served as a model for the Fair Housing legislation, and is structurally and 
linguistically similar in many respects.54   
The Griggs case was brought by African American employees, 
claiming that Duke Power’s Dan River Plant in Draper, North Carolina 
utilized employment practices that had a disproportionate negative impact 
on African Americans and therefore violated Title VII.55  In the 1950s, 
Duke Power's Dan River plant had a policy that African-Americans were 
limited to work in its “Labor Department,” which constituted the lowest-
paying positions in the company.56  In fact, the highest paid African 
American employee made less than the lowest paid white employee.57  In 
1955, the company added the requirement of a high school diploma for its 
higher paying jobs.58  
After the passage of Title VII in 1964, the company no longer 
officially restricted African Americans to the Labor Department, but it 
retained the high school diploma requirement, and added the requirement of 
an IQ test for non-Labor Department jobs.59  African American applicants 
were less likely to hold a high school diploma and averaged lower scores on 
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 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
54
 See infra Section II. 
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 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426. 
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 Id. at 427. 
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the IQ tests;60 thus, they were selected at a much lower rate for these 
positions compared to white candidates.  
The plaintiffs in Griggs used statistical evidence to show that the IQ 
and high school diploma requirements had a disparate impact on African 
Americans.  In North Carolina in 1960, thirty-four percent of white males 
completed high school, while only twelve percent of African American 
males did so.61  Further, fifty-eight percent of whites passed Duke’s 
standardized IQ tests while only six present of African Americans did so.62  
The plaintiffs also showed that whites who had been promoted prior to the 
enactment of the requirements and who had neither passed the IQ test nor 
obtained a high school diploma performed their jobs as well as those who 
did meet the requirements, meaning that the requirements were a poor 
measure of job performance.63 
In its defense, Duke Power argued that its policies were race-neutral 
and that it lacked any intent to discriminate against African Americans.64  
Indeed, the company argued that its lack of discriminatory intent was 
evidenced by its offer to fund high school training for non-high school 
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graduates regardless of race.65  Noting that Title VII prohibits 
discrimination “because of” race, the company argued that racial 
discrimination requires an intent to treat members of a minority group 
differently.66  Without that bad intent, the company asserted, no violation of 
Title VII could be found.67 
The Supreme Court held that Duke Power’s intent or motivation for 
implementing the IQ test and diploma requirements was not the only 
relevant issue; instead, the court indicated that “Congress directed the thrust 
of [Title VII] to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the 
motivation.”68  According to Justice Burger’s majority opinion, practices 
and policies that are “neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of 
intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of 
prior discriminatory employment practices.”69  
The Griggs Court did not hold that employers are without defenses 
when an employment policy is shown to have a disparate impact on a 
protected class.  Instead, after the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of 
disparate impact, Griggs and its progeny indicate that the burden shifts to 
the employer to show that it had a nondiscriminatory business justification 
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 Id. at 432.  
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 Id. at 433.  
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 See id. at 430 n.6, 433.  
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 Id. at 432.   
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for its policy or decision70—i.e. in Griggs, the employer could have avoided 
liability if it had shown that the IQ test and diploma requirements were 
appropriate predictors of job performance.  Once the employer puts forth a 
business justification for its practice, the plaintiff has the final burden to 
show that said justification is unreasonable or is simply a pretext for 
discrimination.71 
Just one year after the Griggs decision, the Supreme Court issued its 
first decision under the Fair Housing Act in an intentional discrimination 
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 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973) (explaining that if the 
respondent successfully carried his burden to establish a prima facie case and petitioner 
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petitioner’s reason for refusing to re-employ was a pretext or discriminatory in its 
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discrimination by showing that there is a reasonable nondiscriminatory alternative to the 
employment practice, which the defendant failed to utilize). 
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case, not a disparate impact case.  That case, Trafficante v. Metro Life72 is 
important to discussions of disparate impact analysis for two main reasons.  
First, in holding that white tenants in an apartment complex who lost the 
social benefits of living in an integrated community had standing to sue 
under the Fair Housing Act, the Supreme Court emphasized that the Fair 
Housing Act is concerned not just with individual acts of discrimination, 
but also with the values of integration.73  Second, the Supreme Court noted 
that the Fair Housing Act’s language is “broad and inclusive”74 and should 
be given “generous construction,”75 two phrases that are important in 
understanding why every circuit that has faced disparate impact claims has 
held that such claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act.76 
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City of Richmond, 789 F. Supp. 725, 731 (E.D. Va. 1992) (“The FHA is ‘broad and 
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Three years after the Griggs decision, the Eighth Circuit was the 
first to hear a disparate impact case under the Fair Housing Act—United 
States v. City of Black Jack.77 
In City of Black Jack, a municipal zoning ordinance that prohibited 
construction of any new multifamily dwellings was challenged on the 
grounds that it would have a disparate impact on minorities, in violation of 
the Fair Housing Act.  At the time, Black Jack, Missouri’s demographic 
makeup was almost completely white, with an African American population 
of between one and two percent.78  St. Louis, which abutted the city of 
Black Jack, was approximately forty percent African American.  The 
plaintiffs argued that Black Jack’s ordinance prohibiting multifamily 
housing, while neutral on its face, would serve to preclude African 
Americans, many of whom were seeking to escape overcrowded conditions 
in St. Louis, from moving into Black Jack.79 
While the facts of the case seemed to support an inference of 
intentional discrimination,80 the Eighth Circuit relied on Equal Protection 
                                                                                                                            
subject to generous construction.”), aff’d in part and vacated in part, Matarese v. 
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principles and disparate impact-oriented analogies to Griggs to hold that the 
zoning ordinance in question resulted in an impermissible disparate impact 
on African Americans.  The Court held that the ordinance in question would 
“contribute to the perpetuation of segregation in a community which was 
[ninety-nine] percent white,” and therefore that it served to “den[y] persons 
housing on the basis of race, in violation of 3604(a).”81 
In 1977, two years after the City of Jack Black decision, the Seventh 
Circuit ruled on a somewhat similar exclusionary zoning case in 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights.  
In that case, a housing developer sought rezoning of a 15-acre parcel of land 
in the Village of Arlington Heights, a suburb of Chicago, in order to 
construct a multi-family development.  The development was to contain 
approximately 290 units, 90 of which would be designated for families with 
low or moderate incomes, and would have required the Village of Arlington 
Heights to change the parcel from a single-family zoning designation to a 
multi-family zoning designation.  The Village of Arlington Heights denied 
the request, and the developer and other plaintiffs brought a suit alleging 
violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment and of the 
Fair Housing Act. 
The trial court in Arlington Heights held that the municipality was 
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not motivated by racial animus when it denied the rezoning, but rather by a 
desire to protect property values.82 Therefore, the trial court reasoned, there 
was no violation of any anti-discrimination law.83 
The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the lower court’s search 
into Arlington Height’s motivation was not the proper inquiry; instead, it 
assessed the disparate impact on minorities in light of “its historical context 
and ultimate effect.”84  Per the 1970 census, the Village’s population was 
64,000, only 27 of whom were African American.85  The Seventh Circuit 
found that the Village had not made “even a small contribution toward 
eliminating the pervasive problem of segregated housing,” and it therefore 
held that the Village’s rejection of the rezoning request had “racially 
discriminatory effects” and could be upheld “only if it were shown that a 
compelling public interest necessitated the decision.”86  Looking only to 
14th Amendment reasoning, the court held that the desire to protect property 
values was not a “compelling public interest” and therefore refusal to 
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rezone violated the 14th Amendment.87 
The Supreme Court did not agree with the Seventh Circuit’s 14th 
Amendment reasoning.  Relying primarily on its decision in Washington v. 
Davis,88 decided after the Seventh Circuit ruling, but before Supreme Court 
oral arguments in Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court indicated that 
governmental action would not be held unconstitutional solely because it 
resulted in a racially disproportionate impact.  “Proof of racially 
discriminatory intent,” the Court held, “is required to show a violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause.”89  Because the Seventh Circuit had only 
considered the constitutional question, and not the Fair Housing question, 
the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit to determine 
whether the disparate impact caused by Village’s denial of the rezoning 
request violated the Fair Housing Act.90 
Relying upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Griggs, upon remand, 
the Seventh Circuit held that a finding of intent is not a prerequisite to a 
finding of discrimination under the Fair Housing Act.91  In short, the 
Seventh Circuit ruled, in what has become known as “Arlington II,” that “at 
least under some circumstances a violation of [the Fair Housing Act] can be 
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established by a showing of discriminatory effect without a showing of 
discriminatory intent.”92  The Seventh Circuit developed a four-prong 
balancing test for determining whether a disparate impact claim should be 
cognizable under the Fair Housing Act, which has been used in three other 
circuits.93 
In the years following the City of Black Jack and Arlington Heights 
decisions, nine more circuits confronted disparate impact cases under the 
Fair Housing Act, and each found disparate impact claims to be 
cognizable.94  The circuits developed methods for evaluating disparate 
impact claims that varied slightly from each other in language and structure, 
but not in focus (with the exception, perhaps, of the Arlington II “four 
factor test” which may require some showing of intentionality). 95  
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Despite over forty years of jurisprudence recognizing the disparate 
impact theory under the Fair Housing Act, opponents of such recognition 
have contended, intermittently, that the Fair Housing Act does not support 
such claims or that such claims require actors to engage in a type of race-
conscious thinking that violates the Equal Protection principles of the 14th 
Amendment.96  The call for the end of disparate impact analysis under the 
Fair Housing Act became more pronounced during the debates about the 
1988 amendments to the Act (and Congress failed to either expressly ratify 
disparate impact analysis by including it in the amendments or to expressly 
disavow it).97  When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in disparate 
                                                                                                                            
impact by showing that (i) he or she is a member of a protected class and (ii) that the 
policy, action or decision in question has a significant disparate impact on members of that 
protected class.  The burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the action in 
question has a manifest relationship to a non-discriminatory objective and that the policy or 
decision is necessary to the achievement of this objective (this is similar to the “business 
necessity” language in Title VII jurisprudence).  Even if a defendant is able to meet its 
justification burden, the plaintiff may still prevail if he or she shows that a viable 
alternative means is available to achieve the policy objective without a discriminatory 
effect.  And finally, (3) a “hybrid test” (used in the First and Second Circuits), which 
combines the two approaches described above.  See Bain, supra note 78, at 1446 nn.83–85; 
see also Ann B. Lever & Todd Espinosa, A Tale of Two Fair Housing Disparate-Impact 
Cases, 15 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 257, 258 (2006).   
96
  Rosenthal, at 2179  
97
 Anti-disparate impact advocates point out that Congress had the opportunity to 
specifically embrace disparate impact analysis as part of the 1988 amendments and chose 
not to do so; proponents of disparate impact, of course, make the opposite claim, arguing 
that, at the time the 1988 amendments were being discussed, Congress was aware that all 
nine Courts of Appeal that had addressed the issue at that time had found that disparate 
impact claims were cognizable under the Fair Housing Act.  Accordingly, per this 
argument, Congressional silence regarding disparate impact constituted a tacit approval of 
the status quo. The Supreme Court, for its part, seems reluctant to infer anything from 
Congressional silence.  See, e.g., Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 106 (2007) 
(“Ordinarily, we resist reading congressional intent into congressional inaction.”); on the 
other hand, see Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174-75 (2009) 
(refusing to apply Title VII’s mixed motive burden-shifting framework to the ADEA 
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impact cases in the 2011-2012 term, and then again in the 2013-2014 term, 
the conversation about disparate impact theory under the Fair Housing Act 
in academic and advocacy circles has evolved from a simmer to a boil.  
 
II.  DISPARATE IMPACT—STARTING WITH THE TEXT OF THE FAIR 
HOUSING ACT 
 
With two disparate impact cases in front of the Supreme Court in 
three years, there has been renewed attention directed at the disparate 
impact theory, especially in the context of challenges to urban renewal 
plans that have a disparate impact on minorities.  Some advocates have 
argued that, unlike Title VII and the ADEA, the text of the Fair Housing 
Act does not support disparate impact claims.98 
To make this case, opponents of disparate impact analysis point to 
the fact that, unlike Title VII and the ADEA, the Fair Housing Act does not 
                                                                                                                            
because when Congress considered the two statutes simultaneously in 1991, it amended 
Title VII to include a mixed motive framework while it did not include such a provision in 
its amendments to the ADEA.); Gross, however, applied to statutes being amended 
simultaneously.  In the case of the Fair Housing Act, Congress simply neglected to amend 
it at the time it amended Title VII. See also Robert G. Schwemm and Sara K. Pratt, 
Disparate Impact under the Fair Housing Act: A Proposed Approach, NAT’L FAIR HOUS. 
ALLIANCE 12 (Dec. 1, 2009), 
http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/Portals/33/DISPARATE%20IMPACT%20ANALYSIS
%20FINAL.pdf. 
98
 See Kirk D. Jensen & Jeffrey P. Naimon, The Fair Housing Act, Disparate Impact 
Claims, and Magner v. Gallagher: An Opportunity to Return to the Primacy of the 
Statutory Text, 129 BANKING L.J. 99, 102-109 (2012); see Petitioners’ Opening Brief at 
17–26, Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., No. 11–1507 
(Aug. 26, 2013); see also Brief for the Petitioners at 20–29, Magner v. Gallagher, No. 10–
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contain the word “affect.”  From this, such advocates infer, congress meant 
for Title VII and the ADEA, but not the Fair Housing Act, to govern actions 
that have a discriminatory effects. 
Linguistically and structurally, however, the Fair Housing Act has as 
much in common with Title VII and the ADEA as possible, given that the 
Fair Housing Act covers housing and the other two acts apply to 
employment.  A portion of each act follows, with relevant provisions 
highlighted: 
                                                                                                                            
1032 (Dec. 22, 2011). 
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99
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1)–(2) (2012) (emphasis added). 
100
 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)–(2) (2012) (emphasis added). 
101
 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–(b) (2012) (emphasis added). 
TITLE VII  
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any 
way, which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because 
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.99 
ADEA 
It shall be unlawful for an employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual's age; 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or 
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise 
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age;100 
FAIR HOUSING ACT 
It shall be unlawful 
(a) to refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to 
negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a 
dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or 
national origin. 
(b) to discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or 
rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection 
therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.101 
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Advocates who argue that the disparate impact standard should 
apply to Title VII and the ADEA matters and not to Fair Housing matters 
point energetically to the fact that Title VII and the ADEA both contain the 
word “affect,” as shown in bold above (and, indeed, via amendment, Title 
VII explicitly deals with disparate impact cases).  These advocates have 
myopically focused on the absence of the single word “affect” in the Fair 
Housing Act without noting the similar or identical language in the key 
substantive language in each Act.   
Each Act contains language that focuses on the motivations of the 
actor.  Title VII and the ADEA make it illegal to “fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual”102 based on his or her membership in a protected 
class.  Similarly, the Fair Housing Act makes it illegal to “refuse to sell or 
rent” based on membership in a protected class.  This language in all three 
acts focuses on the motivation of the actor.  The question posed by this 
language is:  was the actor’s decision animated by the applicant’s race, sex, 
age, national origin, etc.? 
In contrast, each act also contains language that focuses on the 
impacts of potentially neutral decisions on protected classes, as opposed to 
an actor’s motivations.  In the case of Title VII and the ADEA this language 
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appears in subparagraph (2) and indicates that it is illegal to take actions 
that would “deprive or tend to deprive” an individual of employment 
opportunities or “otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee” 
because of membership in a protected class.103  Similarly, in subparagraph 
(1), the Fair Housing Act makes it illegal to “make unavailable or deny” a 
dwelling because of membership in a protected class.104  Both of these 
clauses focus not on the motivations of an actor, but instead on the potential 
discriminatory impacts of actions.  While “affects” language in Title VII 
and the ADEA may be more explicit than the “otherwise make unavailable 
or deny” language in the Fair Housing Act, but the “otherwise make 
unavailable or deny” language, at the very least, can be logically construed 
to support the notion that the Fair Housing Act is concerned with claims 
where the effect of the actions, as opposed to the intent of the actor, is 
central.    
Advocates who argue that, without the “adversely affects” language, 
disparate impact claims simply cannot be cognizable under the Fair 
Housing Act fail to note that the inclusion of the “adversely affects” phrase 
simply would not make sense in the housing context—e.g. the language of 
the Fair Housing Act would have been strange indeed if Congress had made 
                                                                                                                            
102
 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2012). 
103
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1)–(2) (2012) (emphasis added); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) 
(emphasis added). 
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it illegal to “adversely affect” an individual’s “status” as a potential 
homeowner or renter.  Instead, it is the Fair Housing Act’s prohibition 
against actions that would “otherwise make unavailable or deny” housing 
opportunities that gives a textual basis for disparate impact claims under the 
Fair Housing Act.  Actions that have a disparate impact on minorities often 
“make unavailable or deny” housing opportunities because of race, and such 
actions are prohibited by the language of the Act.  
If you think that this debate about the linguistic similarities and 
differences seems strained, I would have to agree.  My argument here is that 
reading disparate impact analysis into Title VII and the ADEA simply 
because those statutes contain the word “affect” while the Fair Housing Act 
omits that word in favor of more descriptive language (i.e. using the 
“otherwise make unavailable or deny” language), is the most strained 
reading possible of the Acts.  Indeed, no court has held that disparate impact 
claims must be based on the “adversely affect” phrase alone.   
As a final note about the text, I turn to the provision that animated 
many decisions in early disparate impact cases under the Fair Housing Act: 
the statement of purpose contained at the beginning of the Act.  The 
statement of purpose reads as follows:  “It is the policy of the United States 
to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the 
                                                                                                                            
104
 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–(b) (2012). 
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United States.”105  Given the remedial purposes of the Fair Housing Act, 
courts have uniformly held that it is to be “given broad and liberal 
construction,”106 
III.   DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY IS NOT ONLY ANOTHER WAY 
TO SHOW INTENT; IT IS A SEPARATE COGNIZABLE THEORY 
 
A. Disparate Impact Evidence Used to Prove Intentional 
Discrimination 
 
Even those who accept that, as discussed above, the text of the Fair 
Housing Act allows for disparate impact theory are sometimes confused 
about how disparate impact theory comes into play in Fair Housing cases, 
particularly in the urban redevelopment context.107  The confusion stems, in 
part, from the fact that disparate-impact evidence can be properly used to 
                                                 
105
 Id. § 3601. 
106 Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 388 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Woods-Drake v. 
Lundy, 667 F.2d 1198, 1201 (5th Cir. 1982)) (quoting Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 
409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972)).  
107
 The Third Circuit criticized the district court decision in Mt. Holly for conflating 
the disparate treatment and disparate impact analyses.  Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in 
Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 383 (3d Cir. 2011).  At times, however, 
the Third Circuit fell into the same trap.  See id. (“[E]stablishment of a prima facie case by 
itself is not enough to establish liability under the FHA.  It simply results in a more 
searching inquiry into the defendant’s motivations . . . .”).   Though it got to the right result 
– that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act – the Third 
Circuit added ‘disparate treatment language’ into its decision.  In a disparate impact case, 
the “more searching inquiry” should not be into the motivations of the defendant, but rather 
into whether there were less discriminatory alternatives that the defendant failed to take.  
See Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved with Good Intentions?: 
Stuck on State of Mind in Antidiscrimination Law, 42 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1141, 1142 
(2007) (noting generally that even when purporting to utilize disparate impact theory, 
courts and litigants often focus on the “state of mind” of decision-makers, blending 
disparate treatment analysis with disparate impact analysis.  “Litigants mix and match 
disparate treatment and disparate impact allegations, defenses, and burdens of proof like 
spring sportswear.”). 
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help prove disparate treatment claims.108  It may help to understand the 
difference between disparate impact and disparate treatment claims through 
the lens of a few examples. 
Consider a recent case from St. Bernard Parish in Louisiana. In that 
lawsuit, litigants claimed, among other things, that the Parish intended109 to 
restrict African Americans from moving into the Parish after Hurricane 
Katrina—a classic disparate treatment claim.110   According to the plaintiffs 
in the case, to accomplish its discriminatory goal of keeping African 
Americans out, the Parish enacted a series of discriminatory ordinances, 
including one that restricted property owners in the Parish (who were 
mostly white) to renting only to their own blood relatives.111  The ordinance 
was neutral of its face –that is, it treated African American and white 
property owners identically.  But the litigants had strong direct evidence of 
                                                 
108
 Id. 1189–91 (“[T]he possible universe of disparate impact cases includes both those 
cases in which discriminatory intent is causing the impact and those in which 
discriminatory intent is having no role in the outcome.”); see also Joseph A. Seiner, 
Disentangling Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment: Adapting the Canadian 
Approach, 25 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 95, 97 (2006)  
109
 The case involved disparate treatment and disparate impact claims, though, for the 
purposes of this discussion, I address the disparate treatment claims. 
110
 Marlene Theberge, Fair Housing Center announces $900,000 settlement agreement 
with St. Bernard Parish; pleased with settlement between United States and Parish, 
GREATER NEW ORLEANS FAIR HOUS. ACTION CTR. (May 10, 2013), 
http://www.gnofairhousing.org/2013/05/10/fair-housing-center-announces-900000-
settlement-agreement-with-st-bernard-parish-pleased-with-settlement-between-united-
states-and-parish/. 
111
 The series of actions intended to restrict African Americans from renting within the 
Parish also included passing an ordinance that required single-family homeowners in 
residential zones to obtain permits before they could rent their properties, revising the 
zoning code to greatly reduce the amount of property available for multifamily housing, 
and perhaps most obviously discriminatory, passing the “blood relative” ordinance 
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intentional discrimination, including the fact that Craig Taffaro, the member 
of the Parish Council who drafted and sponsored the blood-relative 
ordinance, admitted that the goal of the ordinance was  “to maintain the 
demographics,” which, at the time at the time of Hurricane Katrina, was 
86.4% white.112  Additionally, Parish Councilpersons voting against the 
ordinance indicated that the Parish Council’s goal was to “block the blacks 
from living in these areas.”113 
In addition to their direct evidence of intentional discrimination, the 
plaintiffs in the St. Bernard Parish case also had strong circumstantial 
evidence of intentional discrimination, among which was evidence that the 
ordinance would have a disparate impact on African Americans, who, at the 
time, were seeking rental housing in the New Orleans area at much greater 
rates than whites, and who would be largely unable to secure rental housing 
in Saint Bernard Parish under the blood-relative ordinance.  It was clear that 
the decision-makers were aware of this disparate impact; thus, if the case 
had gone forward, the disparate impact evidence could have been used to 
prove a disparate treatment claim.114 
                                                                                                                            
mentioned above.  See Seicshnaydre, supra note 107, at 1189–90. 
112
 See Seicshnaydre, supra note 107, at 1189 & n.257; see also Sabrina Canfield, USA 
Sees Racial Discrimination in New Orleans, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Feb. 2, 2012), 
http://www.courthousenews.com/2012/02/02/4356 
6.htm; see also Time Runs Out For St. Bernard Parish, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/30/opinion/30wed3.html.  
113
 Seicshnaydre, supra note 107, at 1189 & n.258. 
114
 Some argue that disparate impact theory is primarily a tool for litigants to root out 
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B.  Disparate Impact As a Stand-Alone Claim—The Key to Disparate 
Impact Analysis 
 
Disparate impact evidence is not just a way to show that an actor 
had a discriminatory intent when that intent is difficult to prove (though it 
certainly can be used that way)—the thrust of this article and the key to the 
recently-settled Mt. Holly case (and, presumably, the next disparate impact 
case to reach the Supreme Court) is an argument that disparate impact 
evidence can support independent claims under the Fair Housing Act, even 
when there was no discernible intent to discriminate.  As explained in 
greater detail in Section IV, the use of disparate impact as a stand-alone 
claim is, perhaps, most important in urban redevelopment cases, where the 
intent of municipal actors often has little to do with whether a municipal 
decision will further segregation or limit housing opportunities for the very 
communities the Fair Housing Act seeks to protect.  
Another example, this time involving a disparate impact claim, 
might prove useful.  Imagine that a municipality seeks to redevelop at least 
one of its many blighted neighborhoods.  To accomplish its redevelopment 
                                                                                                                            
hard-to-prove intentional discrimination, and it may have been utilized this way in some 
portions of the St. Bernard litigation.  Certainly, as explained herein evidence of a disparate 
impact can be used to shore up a disparate treatment claim–e.g. evidence that a policy 
disproportionately impacts minorities and that the decision-makers knew of such the 
disproportionate impact could lead a fact finder to infer that the decision-maker intended 
the disparate result because of racial animus.  But disparate impact claims can and should 
stand on their own.  For a more detailed analysis of some theorists’ argument that disparate 
impact analysis is simply an “evidentiary dragnet” aimed at catching intentional 
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goal, the municipality plans to purchase or take properties, destroy all 
existing structures, and rebuild the community as a mixed-income 
development (much as it did in the Mt. Holly case).  No matter which 
blighted neighborhood the municipality chooses, it is likely that many of the 
current residents will be unable to afford to return to the neighborhood once 
it is redeveloped.  Due to past government-sanctioned discrimination, now-
outlawed restrictive covenants, and perhaps some element of personal 
preference, one of the blighted neighborhoods is mostly African American 
while another one of the blighted neighborhoods is mostly white.  In both of 
the neighborhoods on the table for redevelopment, the current residents are 
largely opposed to the plans.  The municipality chooses to redevelop, and 
hence dismantle, the African American neighborhood, not because the 
decision-makers harbor a racist intent, but because the community meetings 
on the matter took place in the evenings, at a time when minorities were less 
able to attend than whites, and, as a result, slightly fewer minorities showed 
up to object to the redevelopment than their white neighbors.   
This is an example of a case that does not involve any intent to 
discriminate; the municipality made its decision based on a neutral factor – 
the number of residents voicing opposition to the project – but its effect will 
be disproportionately born by African Americans, most of who will have to 
                                                                                                                            
discrimination that otherwise might be missed.  See id. at 1189. 
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leave the municipality, which will increase racial segregation.  Here, 
evidence of disparate impact would not be used to buttress a claim for 
intentional discrimination, but instead would stand on its own under the Fair 
Housing Act.  If the Fair Housing Act is to have any chance at succeeding 
at its drafters’ goal of replacing the ghetto with “truly integrated and 
balanced living patterns,”115 the mere fact that an action has a disparate 
impact on a protected class must result in a cognizable claim under the Fair 
Housing Act.116  
IV.  DISPARATE IMPACT ANALYSIS IS NEEDED TO ENSURE THAT 
URBAN REDEVELOPMENT DECISIONS DO NOT UNDERMINE THE 
GOALS OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 
 
The underlying facts of disparate impact cases in the urban 
redevelopment context make it plain that these types of cases, even more 
than the employment discrimination cases to which they are analogized, cry 
out for disparate impact analysis for three main reasons: First, urban 
redevelopment decisions, unlike employment decisions, are often made 
through a diffuse and complicated process where intent is neither relevant to 
                                                 
115
 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale). 
116
 Recall that the question before the Supreme Court in the Gallagher and Mt. Holly 
cases was simply whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing 
Act.  If found cognizable, that certainly does not determine the merits of individual cases—
courts will still have to engage in the burden shifting analysis described in Griggs and other 
Title VII and Fair Housing cases (and now formalized in a HUD rule).  The question before 
the Court in Gallagher and Mt. Holly was simply whether plaintiffs who lose housing 
opportunities due to an action that has a disparate impact on minorities may walk through 
the courthouse doors—as explained elsewhere in this article, such plaintiffs must then 
shoulder a heavy evidentiary burden. 
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whether discrimination occurred nor possible to discern.  Second, widely 
accepted social science research tells us that much racism occurs with no 
discriminatory intent at all.117  Given the protracted manner in which urban 
redevelopment decisions are made, it is especially possible that unconscious 
bias could influence the outcome.  Finally, urban redevelopment decisions 
are among the main forces shaping our cities right now; the ills of 
segregation will not be remedied by simply thwarting the actions of 
individual intentional discriminators.    
A.  Intent Is Not Relevant (And Can Be Impossible to Discern) When 
Decisions Are Made Via a Diffuse Process   
 
In the employment context (to which Fair Housing Act cases are 
frequently compared) decisions are often linear and made by individuals 
acting alone—a supervisor, for example, may institute a policy that 
disadvantages minorities or a Human Resources manager may create a test 
that filters out African American applicants.  In these cases, while it may be 
challenging to prove intent, especially when individuals take pains to mask 
it, a discriminatory intent can often be found at the root of a discriminatory 
                                                 
117
 See Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 493, 506–07, 532–33 (2003) (discussing the Supreme Court’s endorsement 
of disparate impact theory since 1971); see also Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, 
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 
(1987); Destiny Peery, Note & Comment, The Colorblind Ideal in A Race-Conscious 
Reality: The Case for A New Legal Ideal for Race Relations, 6 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 
473, 481 (2011). 
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result.118  In contrast, decisions related to housing, especially in the urban 
redevelopment context, are often made by diffuse municipal bodies in 
which individuals and groups have differing and even conflicting 
motivations, and where a discriminatory intent may not be present, even 
where a discriminatory result ensues.   
Looking more closely at how decisions regarding urban 
redevelopment are made, it is easy to see how a linear or definable “intent” 
may be absent in many urban redevelopment or land use decisions.  Unlike 
in the employment context, in the urban redevelopment context, decisions 
are not made by one individual or entity; instead, decisions are made via a 
complex democratic process involving many competing constituencies.  It 
is possible that a planning committee may be concerned with traffic, the 
environmental review board may be concerned with impacts on wildlife, a 
mayor may be concerned with street safety, and residents may be concerned 
with density.  The process to create a redevelopment plan may take years 
and involve tens or hundreds of individual, each with different agendas. But 
if the result of the decision-making process is a plan that will have a 
substantial segregating impact or if a project would foreclose housing 
                                                 
118
 See generally Selmi, supra note 6, at 776–81 (“Because subtle discrimination is not 
fueled by a conscious motive or any express animus, there has been a struggle in the 
literature to determine whether existing proof structures can accommodate the changed 
nature of discrimination, and some scholars have proposed new proof structures that 
typically fuse elements of intent and impact.”).  As explained in Section II of this article, 
disparate impact evidence could be utilized to prove a disparate treatment claim, such as 
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opportunities to a protected class, the Fair Housing Act should (and, under 
the precedent in eleven circuits, does) require municipalities to consider 
alternatives that would have a less discriminatory impact.119 
Recent events, such as Hurricane Katrina, display how diffuse 
decision-making may result in disparate and discriminatory impacts, even 
when there is no intent to discriminate.120  As one scholar asks “[d]oes it 
matter that no one intended for a disproportionate number of poor persons 
of color to be left behind when Hurricane Katrina hit? . . . Does it matter 
that no one intended for those without the resources to leave to be now 
unable to find the resources to return?”121  Even if those individuals and 
entities making decisions have no discriminatory intent at all, shouldn’t the 
Fair Housing Act prevent New Orleans from being reconstructed as a city 
that is largely unavailable to African American residents?  Surely this is the 
type of situation that the Fair Housing Act should address given that it 
makes it illegal not just to “discriminate” on the basis of race, but also to 
                                                                                                                            
the one described in this example. 
119
 It is important to point out that the issue in the Gallagher and Mt. Holly cases is not 
whether every litigant who can show that a municipal decision has a disparate impact on 
minorities should win his or her case; the issue is only whether such cases are cognizable 
under the Fair Housing Act.  If they are, as 11 circuits have held, then plaintiffs must still 
show that there was a less discriminatory manner by which the municipality could have 
accomplished its legitimate goals and that the municipality failed to pursue that less 
discriminatory alternative. 
120
 As discussed in Section IV of this article, many municipalities behaved in ways that 
were intentionally discriminatory after Hurricane Katrina; others, however, passed 
ordinances and took actions that could not be traced to a discriminatory intent but still had 
a discriminatory effect. 
121
  Seicshnaydre, supra note 107, at 1188. 
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“otherwise make unavailable or deny” housing because of race. 
Other post-Katrina ordinances further highlight the fact that intent 
cannot be the only inquiry in Fair Housing matters, because of the diffuse 
and multi-layered manner in which housing-related decisions come into 
being.  Shortly after the storm, the Pointe Coupee Parish, near New Orleans, 
adopted an ordinance reading:  “RESOLVED, that trailer parks of 
temporary housing for displaced evacuees of Hurricane Katrina and Rita not 
be created by FEMA in Point Coupee Parish.”122 Perhaps the 
councilmembers who passed the ordinance were concerned with traffic, 
aesthetics, or increased enrollment in schools.  Perhaps they were retaliating 
against FEMA, an agency that, after Hurricane Katrina, was viewed largely 
bas ineffective, at best, and intentionally negligent, at worst.  Perhaps the 
intents of the individuals shifted over time, as the ordinance made its way 
through the democratic process.  But regardless of intent, if the council’s 
action served to lock African American residents out of the Parish or 
increase segregation in the area, surely those residents must be able to 
pursue a claim under the Fair Housing Act.123  As one author asks, if it were 
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  See id. at 1190 & n.262; see also Pointe Coupee Parish, La., Resolution on 
Temporary Housing in Pointe Coupee Parish (Nov. 8, 2005). 
123
 Note that plaintiffs in such a case might not prevail under the Fair Housing Act.  As 
discussed in throughout this article, in most circuits prior to the recent HUD rule, and 
presumably in all circuits after the HUD rule, disparate impact analysis allows plaintiffs to 
establish a prima facie case, after which defendants have an opportunity to show that the 
action in question was taken in pursuit of a legitimate objective.  The burden then shifts 
back to the plaintiff to show that there was a less discriminatory alternative, which the 
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established that the majority of those displaced persons in need of housing 
were persons of color and that the ordinance would serve to exclude such 
people from Pointe Coupee Parish, does it matter what went on the minds of 
the decision-makers?124   
Looking at the Mt. Holly case – the Fair Housing case granted 
certiorari by the Supreme Court in the 2012-2013 term – it is easy to see 
how an intent to discriminate can be divorced from whether a municipal 
decision has an impact that would undermine the purposes of the Fair 
Housing Act.  As noted above, in that case, the municipality spent a 
considerable amount of time studying the Gardens neighborhood before 
declaring it “blighted” and instituting a redevelopment plan that would wipe 
the existing neighborhood off the map and scatter most of the Townships 
minority residents to already segregated areas.125  There is no evidence that 
any of the many influencers and decision makers had an intent to increase 
racial isolation or further segregation—no individual councilmember made 
a racist remark, no document revealed racial animus, and no paper trail 
created an inference of discriminatory intent.   
Unlike in the employment context (where decisions are usually 
made through a linear and hierarchical system), no one individual or body 
                                                                                                                            
plaintiff failed to pursue. 
124
 Seicshnaydre, supra note 107, at 1190. 
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was entirely responsible for the multitude of decisions that led to the 
redevelopment plans in Mt. Holly.  The developer worked with architects, 
banks and city planners to devise a redevelopment plan; the planning 
department, environmental review board, traffic department and other 
committees likely weighed in; public input was taken into consideration; the 
plan was revised numerous times over the course of years, etc.  With such a 
diffuse and protracted process, it would be impossible to ascertain a specific 
intent to discriminate, and indeed such intent may not exist.  But, if the 
result of such a decision-making process fuels segregation, shouldn’t such a 
claim be cognizable under the Fair Housing Act?  
As stated elsewhere in this article, the question before the Supreme 
Court in the Gallagher case and the Mt. Holly case is not whether the 
plaintiffs should win on the merits, but simply whether they may have their 
day in court.  If disparate impact claims are found to be cognizable under 
the Fair Housing Act, then courts engage in the burden shifting analysis first 
outlined in Griggs and then followed in most Fair Housing cases.126  At its 
core, the burden shifting analysis simply asks courts to determine whether 
there was another less discriminatory way for the defendant to accomplish 
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 Brief for Mt. Holly Gardens Respondents at 8–9, Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly 
Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., No. 11-1507 (Oct. 21, 2013). 
126
 As previously the majority of circuits utilize a burden-shifting paradigm, while 
some use a four-factor test.  Presumably, since the codification of the recent HUD Rule 
regarding disparate impact, all circuits will utilize the burden shifting mechanism described 
therein. 
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its legitimate non-discriminatory goal.  If another path exists for 
municipalities to accomplish their legitimate non-discriminatory 
redevelopment goals, which would have a less damaging impact on the 
communities that the Fair Housing Act intends to protect, then, under the 
current Fair Housing Act jurisprudence, the municipality could be forced to 
pursue that alternate path—a result that seems in line with both the Fair 
Housing Act, and, presumably (assuming that it had no intent to 
discriminate), the general will of the municipality at issue. 
Requiring a showing of intent under the Fair Housing Act 
(something the Supreme Court seems poised to do) would ignore the basic 
facts of housing discrimination cases—cases in which, because of the 
diffuse decision-making process at issue, intent is neither discernible nor 
relevant to the question of whether discrimination occurred.  
B.  Social Science Tells Us That Intent is Not A Critical Element of 
Discrimination 
Requiring proof of discriminatory intent as a prerequisite to a Fair 
Housing Act claim “ignores much of what [is understood] about how the 
human mind works.”127  Racial bias, we know from multiple social science 
studies, is so ingrained in our culture that acting on such bias can rarely be 
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 Lawrence, supra note 117, at 323.  The author is writing about the Equal Protection 
Clause and not the Fair Housing Act, yet he suggests that if the symbol has cultural 
connotations or implications, it can be  assumed it is demonstrative of unconscious racist 
intent. 
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called intentional.128  Indeed, as one scholar put it, “insisting that a 
blameworthy perpetrator be found before the existence of racial 
discrimination can be acknowledged...creates an imaginary world” which 
serves to perpetuate discrimination by failing to even acknowledge its 
presence.129  
One judge, writing about the increased focus on intent in the 
employment discrimination context, described the “imaginary world” that a 
requirement of intent would create as follows: 
It is as if the bench is saying:  Discrimination is 
over.  The market is bias-free . . . . The complex 
phenomenon that is discrimination can be reduced to a 
simple paradigm of the errant discriminator or the 
explicitly biased policy, a paradigm that rarely 
matches the reality of twenty-first-century life.130 
 
Another scholar put it this way: 
The urban oppression now experienced by so 
many blacks is neither natural nor inevitable.  In 
assessing responsibility, little is gained by searching 
out individual perpetrators.  A regime sustains 
subordination through generating “devices, 
institutions, and circumstances that impose burdens or 
constraints on the target group without resort to 
repeated or individualized discriminatory actions.”131 
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 See id. at 317; Primus, supra note 117, at 532–33; Peery, supra note 3, at 481. 
129
 Lawrence, supra note 117, at 324–25. 
130
 Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 111–112 (2012) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
131
 Calmor, supra note 32, at 1508 (quoting Eric Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past 
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Even where there is a single decision-maker (as opposed to the 
diffuse process described above), social science tells us that discrimination 
can occur, and indeed more often than not does occur, without intent.  
Where there are multiple decision-makers, working towards consensus 
through a lengthy and protracted urban redevelopment process, the 
likelihood that implicit bias will play a role in the outcome is only 
increased.   
Municipal bodies, such as planning boards, exist to make decisions 
that impact large groups of people.  The conscious intent of the body to, for 
example, ease traffic congestion in a particular area might be entirely 
divorced from whether the outcome has a discriminatory impact due to the 
effects of implicit bias.  If municipal leaders, trying to ease traffic 
congestion in a white neighborhood, decide to construct a highway through 
the area’s only African American neighborhood, it may be entirely possible 
that the decision-makers had no intent  to harm  African Americans.  At the 
same time, we know from countless studies that biased results occur even 
where there is no discriminatory intent.132  Municipal decision makers, like 
all of us, implicitly make judgments on the worth and value of particular 
people and neighborhoods, and, when those judgments have biased or 
                                                                                                                            
Discrimination, 96 HARV. L. REV. 828, 828 (1983)). 
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 See Lawrence, supra note 117, at 317; Primus, supra note 117, at 532–33; Peery, 
supra note 3, at 481. 
56 IN DEFENSE OF DISPARATE IMPACT  
discriminatory results, the fact that the decision maker did not intend the 
bias is of no comfort to those impacted. 
In the Township of Mt. Holly, for example, it is likely that the 
individuals, from those involved in the decision to declare the Gardens 
neighborhood “blighted,” to those responsible for generating the 
redevelopment plan, harbored implicit biases, which made them more likely 
to support the destruction of a minority community (as opposed to a 
redevelopment plan that would be more likely to increase integration).  
There is little in the text of the Fair Housing Act or the existing Fair 
Housing Act jurisprudence to suggest that the Fair Housing Act is meant to 
distinguish between the type of implicit bias described above and 
intentional discrimination. 
C.  The Success of the Fair Housing Act Depends on the Survival of 
Disparate Impact Jurisprudence 
 
Urban redevelopment decisions are among the main forces shaping 
our cities and towns, and, as noted above, disparate treatment analysis alone 
is not sufficient to thwart the segregating effects that sometimes flow from 
such decisions.  If it is to achieve its goal of providing increased and better 
housing opportunities for members of protected classes, Fair Housing 
advocates need a tool that will address most pressing fair housing 
concern—the manner in which municipalities engage in development. 
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Recall that the survival of disparate treatment analysis will not 
prevent  redevelopment of urban areas; instead, it will push municipalities 
contemplating redevelopment projects to consider whether there might be a 
path towards its legitimate interest that has a lesser disparate impact on a 
minority community.  Assuming that the decision-makers within the 
municipality have no discriminatory intent, such a push will generally be in 
line with the municipality’s goals. 
 
V.  RESPONDING TO COMMON CONCERNS 
In this section, I respond to some common concerns about disparate 
impact analysis—e.g. that it requires race-consciousness in a statutory 
context that seems to promote racial blindness; that municipalities and 
housing providers will not know how to avoid liability; and that all urban 
redevelopment decisions will subject municipalities to litigation. 
A.  The Fair Housing Act Allows, and in Some Cases Even Requires, Some 
Amount of Race-Consciousness  
 
Critics of disparate impact analysis assert that the Fair Housing Act 
prohibits decision-making “because of race.”133  Disparate impact analysis, 
                                                 
133
 As noted in Section II, section 3604 indicates that  
“[I]t shall be unlawful— 
       (a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to 
refuse to negotiate for the 
sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling 
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these critics claim, requires decision-makers to consider race, and therefore 
the Fair Housing Act or Equal Protection principles must forbid such a 
method of analysis.134  Indeed, the critics are right—disparate impact 
analysis does require decision-makers to consider race in some instances.  
For example, in order to avoid liability under the burden-shifting analysis 
described above, decision-makers may need to evaluate whether there are 
means to accomplish their objectives that would have a less discriminatory 
effect.  Municipalities engaged in redevelopment projects such as the one at 
issue in the Mt. Holly case might avoid liability by studying the potential 
impacts of decisions on particular racial groups in an effort to determine a 
path with the least discriminatory outcome.    
This type of race-conscious thinking, critics of disparate impact 
claim, is precisely the type of race-based decision-making that the Fair 
Housing Act sought to eradicate.  It is hard to imagine, however, that the 
Fair Housing Act is not meant to incentivize municipal decision-makers to 
seek the path with the least discriminatory effect when making decisions 
                                                                                                                            
to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or 
national origin. 
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or 
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or 
facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, 
familial status, or national origin.  
     42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–(b) (emphasis added).   
134
 For a discussion of disparate impact analysis and the Equal Protection Clause, see 
generally, Lawrence Rosenthal, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2157, 2179 (2013) and Richard 
Primus, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341 (2010). 
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about community redevelopment. 
Indeed, the Fair Housing Act does not have a single, race-blind, 
purpose. 135  Instead, it appears to have a number of sometimes-conflicting 
objectives.  On the one hand, one of its goals is to eradicate segregation, or, 
as its sponsor, Senator Mondale put it, replace the “ghettos” with “truly 
integrated and balanced living patterns.”136  On the other hand, the Fair 
Housing Act is clearly also concerned with preventing race from being a 
factor in housing related decision-making.137  
Even the language in the “purpose” clause of the Fair Housing Act 
is, at best, unhelpful in determining whether Congress originally intended 
the Fair Housing Act to allow for race-conscious thinking.  It indicates that 
its purpose is to provide “for fair housing throughout the United States.”138  
What “fair housing” means, and whether race can be taken into account at 
all in ensuring that it is provided in accordance with the Act, is not made 
clear. 
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 See SCHWEMM, supra note 27, § 11:3 (noting that the Fair Housing Act’s dual goals 
of integration and nondiscrimination are sometimes in conflict with one another). 
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 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968); SCHWEMM, supra note 27, § 2:3. 
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 The legislative history of the Fair Housing Act supports the notion that Congress 
was concerned with both remedying discrimination and alleviating segregation. Addressing 
the issue of segregation, Senator Mondale, the Fair Housing Act’s principle sponsor hoped 
that the Fair Housing Act would remedy the alienation of whites and Blacks caused by the 
“lack of experience in actually living next” to each other.  114 CONG. REC. 2275 (1968).   
Similarly, on the House side, Congressman Celler, the Chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee indicated that the purpose of the Fair Housing Act would be to eliminate the 
“blight of segregated housing and the pale of the ghetto.” 114 CONG. REC. 9559 (1967). 
138
 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012). 
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Courts first grappled with the issue of whether the Fair Housing Act 
allows for (and perhaps calls for) race-consciousness in two disparate 
treatment cases in the early 1970s.  In the first, Shannon v. HUD, the Third 
Circuit held that the Fair Housing Act’s demand in Section 3608 that the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) act to 
“affirmatively to further” fair housing prohibited HUD from funding a 
housing project in a minority neighborhood without first considering the 
impact that the project would have on racial concentration in the area.139  In 
that case, the Court held that HUD could not ignore the negative effects (or 
disparate impact) that its decisions might have on minority neighborhoods; 
according to the Court, “[t]oday, such color blindness is impermissible.”140 
In Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, issued three years 
after the Shannon decision, the Second Circuit held that a public housing 
agency could favor white applicants over African Americans for units in a 
new housing complex if the policy was necessary to maintain integration in 
the area.141  In Otero, the housing agency was concerned that, if a race-
conscious application program was not used, the complex would “tip” and 
become all Black due to white flight.  The Court held that a race-conscious 
tenant selection system could be used if there was “convincing evidence” 
                                                 
139
 Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 816 (3d Cir. 1970).   
140 Id. at 820. 
141
 See Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973). 
 IN DEFENSE OF DISPARATE IMPACT 61 
that a color-blind system would “almost surely lead to eventual destruction 
of the racial integration that presently exists in the community.”142 
The most famous Fair Housing case involving race-conscious 
tenant-selection aimed at promoting integration is United States v. Starrett 
City Associates.143  In that case, the defendants were owners of a huge 
housing complex in New York that consisted of forty-six high-rise 
buildings, which housed over 17,000 residents.  In order to maintain the 
complex as an integrated community, the defendants established a tenant 
selection system with strict quotas by race.  Because far more African 
American and Latinos applied to be residents, the quota system resulted in 
large numbers of minorities being rejected in favor of white applicants.  In a 
two-to-one decision, the Second Circuit struck down Starrett City’s quota 
program, distinguishing it from the program in Otero because Otero’s 
program was temporary and related only to the lease-up of apartments while 
Starrett City’s program was ongoing.  Race-consciousness is acceptable, the 
Second Circuit held, as long as it is temporary in nature.  Per the Court, 
additional factors to consider would be (1) whether the plan or action is 
designed to remedy some prior racial discrimination or imbalance and (2) 
whether the plan seeks to increase opportunities for minorities as opposed to 
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 Id. at 1136. 
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 United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988).  
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limiting them.144 
The Fair Housing Act’s comfort with some amount of race-
consciousness extends beyond tenant-selection programs to other housing-
related decisions as well.  For example, HUD has promulgated regulations 
requiring participants in federal housing programs to reach out to certain 
racial and ethnic groups.145  HUD has also required municipalities utilizing 
certain federal funds to certify that the municipality is taking measures to 
“affirmatively further fair housing” and to “aid in the prevention or 
elimination of slums or blight.”146  In order to ensure that municipalities are 
properly furthering fair housing goals, HUD requires municipalities to study 
the impacts of proposed housing programs on racial groups and to formulate 
responses that promote integration and housing opportunity for members of 
protected classes.  Indeed, in the time since certiorari was granted in the Mt. 
Holly case, HUD has issued two new regulations which explicitly call for 
race-consciousness in housing decisions.  The first explains HUD’s 
approach to disparate impact cases, and was promulgated, it seems, in direct 
response to the question raised in Gallagher and Mt. Holly.147  The second, 
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 See generally id. at 1101–02 (explaining that unlike in the affirmative action 
context, where “measures designed to increase or ensure minority participation, such as 
‘access’ quotas have generally been upheld . . . . [P]rograms designed to maintain 
integration by limiting minority participation, such as ceiling quotas are of doubtful 
validity”) (internal citations omitted).  
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 See 24 C.F.R. § 200.600 et seq. 
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 42 U.S.C. § 5304(b)(2), (3) (2012). 
147
 According to the HUD-issued summary, the rule “formalizes the longstanding 
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which is still in draft form, provides a structure through which 
municipalities that receive certain federal funds must study the impact of 
municipal decision making on housing opportunities for protected 
classes.148 
Thus, while courts have held that strict quotas that limit housing 
opportunities for minorities are not permissible, courts and HUD are 
comfortable with some element of race-consciousness in housing, provided 
that the race-consciousness furthers the Fair Housing Act’s goal of 
promoting integration or providing increased housing opportunities to 
members of protected classes. 
In summary, the Fair Housing Act’s anti-discrimination principles 
                                                                                                                            
interpretation of the Fair Housing Act to include discriminatory effects liability and 
establishes a uniform standard of liability for facially neutral practices that have a 
discriminatory effect.”  78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,479 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24 
C.F.R. pt. 100).  Under the rule, the burden-shifting approach is as follows: “(1) the 
charging party first bears the burden of proving its prima facie case of either disparate 
impact or perpetuation of segregation; (2) then the burden shifts to the defendant to prove 
that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more of its legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory interests; and (3) if the defendant satisfies its burden, the charging party 
may still establish liability by demonstrating that the substantial, legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory interests could be served by a practice that has a less discriminatory 
effect.  24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2013).  By requiring the parties to examine whether there is a 
“less discriminatory” path, the HUD rule requires a certain amount of race-conscious 
thinking. 
148 78 Fed. Reg. 43,710 (proposed July 19, 2013) (according to the HUD-issued 
summary of the proposed regulation, the purpose of the regulation is to “focus[] program 
participants’ analysis on four primary goals: improving integrated living patterns and 
overcoming historic patterns of segregation; reducing racial and ethnic concentrations of 
poverty; reducing disparities by race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or 
disability in access to community assets such as education, transit access, and employment, 
as well as exposure to environmental health hazards and other stressors that harm a 
person’s quality of life; and responding to disproportionate housing needs by protected 
class.”  
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are usually primary, and those principles only give way and allow a certain 
amount of race-conscious thinking when to do so would further the Fair 
Housing Act’s integrationist goals or would prevent policies that have an 
unjustified disparate impact on the groups which the Fair Housing Act seeks 
to protect. 
B.  Disparate Impact Analysis Is Not Limitless 
 
The second main critique of the disparate impact theory is that it 
knows no bounds and that liability will be found wherever there is proof of 
even the slightest disparate impact based on race.149   
Disparate impact theory does not call for liability whenever a 
disparate impact is detected; indeed, a finding of disparate impact is only 
the first step in the analysis—it is what may allow plaintiffs to get to the 
courthouse door.  But a simple showing of disparate impact alone is not 
enough to open those courthouse doors.  First, plaintiffs must make out a 
prima facie case by showing that a particular practice led or will lead to a 
racially disparate result.  Pointing to the disparate effect itself is not enough; 
plaintiffs must show that a particular policy or action is responsible for the 
result.150   Relatedly, plaintiffs must show causation—that is that the policy 
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 Petitioners’ Opening Brief at 39–44, Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens 
Citizens in Action, Inc., No. 11-1507 (Aug. 26, 2013). 
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 See Vega v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., No. CV-10-02087-PHX-NVW, 
2011 WL 2457398, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 20, 2011) (explaining that if Plaintiff cannot point 
to any “specific outwardly neutral practices that Defendants took that had a 
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or practice in question caused the disparate results. 
Additionally, liability will not hold when only minor disparate 
impacts are found.151  The statistical evidence used must show that there is a 
significant disparity in the effects of a particular policy or decision based on 
race.152  Courts scrutinize the statistical evidence carefully, and require that 
it show not just that there was some disparate impact, but that the disparate 
impact is so severe that to ignore it would be to thwart the purposes of the 
Fair Housing Act.153 
In addition to placing a heavy burden on the plaintiff, disparate 
impact analysis under the Fair Housing Act provides defendants with an 
opportunity to explain the disparate impact away; similar to the “business 
justification” rule in Title VII cases, defendants in Fair Housing cases can 
escape liability if they show that the facially neutral rule or decision which 
                                                                                                                            
disproportionate impact upon her based on her race[]” her claim will fail). 
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 See Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 234 F. Supp. 2d 33, 62 (D. Mass. 2002) 
(“The standard is not just disparate impact, but substantial disparate impact.”). 
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 Id. (“[W]here a community has a smaller proportion of minority residents than does 
the larger geographical area from which it draws applicants to its Section 8 program, a 
selection process that favors its residents cannot but work a disparate impact on 
minorities.”). 
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 See Khalil v. Farash Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 203, 210 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that 
some “numbers are too small to be of any statistical significance  . . . . ”), aff’d, 277 Fed. 
App’x 81 (2d Cir. 2008); see, e.g., Tsombanidis v. West Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565, 
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housing disparate impact claims”); Pollis v. New School for Social Research, 132 F.3d 
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observed pattern is attributable to other factors and accordingly the less persuasive the 
inference of discrimination to be drawn from it.”); Waisome v. Port Auth. of New York 
and New Jersey, 948 F.2d 1370, 1379 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[W]here statistics are based on a 
relatively small number of occurrences, the presence or absence of statistical significance is 
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led to the disparate impact is necessary to accomplish a legitimate objective. 
Perhaps the most significant limit placed on the disparate impact 
theory is that the plaintiff has the burden of showing that there was a less 
discriminatory means to achieve the defendant’s objective.  The plaintiff 
cannot simply assert that the result of a policy is discriminatory; he or she 
must also show that there was another way to achieve the same legitimate 
policy objective without a disparate impact (or with a significantly less 
burdensome disparate impact).  If that proves to be an impossible feat, the 
defendant will prevail. 
This is no small burden.  Indeed, even while recognizing that 
disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act, when 
they get to the merits of cases, at the appellate level most courts have held 
that plaintiffs have failed to carry the burden of proving that the defendant 
failed to pursue a less discriminatory alternative.   Indeed, on appeal, 
plaintiffs have received positive decisions in less than twenty percent of the 
disparate impact claims considered under the Fair Housing Act since its 
inception.154 
An examination of cases in which plaintiffs did not prevail in 
                                                                                                                            
not a reliable indicator of disparate impact.”). 
154
 Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having any Impact? An Appellate 
Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims under the Fair Housing Act, 63 AM. U. 
L. REV. ___ (2013) 
 IN DEFENSE OF DISPARATE IMPACT 67 
disparate impact claims highlights the high bar for such claims.  In Darst-
Webbe Tenant Ass'n Bd. v. St. Louis Housing Authority,155 for example, 
plaintiffs sought to thwart plans to replace 758 low income public housing 
units with a mix of housing that included only 80 low income housing units.  
The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that the plan would have a disparate 
impact on African Americans who occupied almost every one of the 758 
low income units, but it held that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of 
presenting a less discriminatory plan that would accomplish all of the 
defendant’s policy objectives.156  Cases such as these highlight the fact that 
plaintiffs cannot simply sit back and complain about a disparate impact, no 
matter how severe; they must also point to a realistic and sound solution 
that the defendant could implement in place of its proposed action.  
Despite this high bar, critics of disparate impact analysis still bristle 
at the “less discriminatory means” portion of the burden-shifting test.  
“Should decision-makers have to waste time studying every possible 
alternative to make sure that there is no less discriminatory course of 
action?” they ask.  Courts in eleven circuits have answered “yes.”157  Given 
the long history of racial discrimination that the Fair Housing Act seeks to 
remedy and the problems associated with entrenched segregation, courts 
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2005). 
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have held that it is not too much to ask municipalities and housing providers 
to consider the impacts of their decisions on protected classes and seek the 
least discriminatory path towards achieving legitimate objectives.  In the 
Third Circuit’s decision in Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action v. Twp. of 
Mount Holly, the court noted: 
 [t]he Township may be correct that a 
disparate impact analysis will often allow 
plaintiffs to make out a prima facie case when 
a segregated neighborhood is redeveloped in 
circumstances where there is a shortage of 
alternative affordable housing.  But this is a 
feature of the FHA’s programming, not a bug.  
The FHA is a broadly remedial statute 
designed to prevent and remedy invidious 
discrimination on the basis of race that 
facilitates its antidiscrimination agenda by 
encouraging a searching inquiry into the 
motives behind a contested policy to ensure 
that it is not improper.158   
 
Without disparate impact analysis, municipalities and other 
decision-makers will have no incentive to consider the impacts proposed 
actions may have on classes protected under the Fair Housing Act; and 
without this incentive, there will be little chance that the Fair Housing Act 
will nudge our society towards more integrated and fair housing patterns.  
Laws are not just means of determining liability; they are structures that 
drive behavior.  If the Fair Housing Act will have any hope of addressing 
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 Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 
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modern housing segregation, it will be because, when making 
redevelopment decisions, municipalities will be forced to consider the 
potential disparate impacts of municipal actions. 
C.  An Additional Limit Proposed 
 
As discussed above, even while accepting disparate impact theory as 
cognizable, courts have been explicit in highlighting the fact that disparate 
impact theory is not without bounds—courts have held that the disparate 
impacts must be severe, that plaintiffs have the burden of showing that there 
was a less discriminatory means of accomplishing defendants’ goals, and 
that a particular policy caused the disparate impact.  In addition to those 
explicit limitations, courts have often implicitly suggested an additional 
limitation—relying on the Fair Housing Act’s dual purpose of prohibiting 
discrimination and ending segregation, courts have held that, in order to be 
successful, plaintiffs must show that the defendant’s actions would either 
limit housing opportunities for members of a protected class (i.e. “otherwise 
make unavailable or deny” housing) or increase segregation (or both).159  
The Fair Housing Act’s dual goals of prohibiting discrimination and 
ending segregation occasionally raises the question of what courts should 
                                                                                                                            
384–85 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted). 
159
 See Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d at 1101, 1103 (“We hold…that Title VIII does 
not allow appellants to use rigid racial quotas of indefinite duration to maintain a fixed 
level of integration at Starrett City by restricting minority access to scarce and desirable 
rental accommodations otherwise available to them.”). 
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do when the resolution of a case would put the Fair Housing Act’s anti-
discrimination goals in conflict with its anti-segregation goals.  Put another 
way, what should a court do when the antidiscrimination principle is in 
conflict with the “anti-subordination” principle? 
Under the antidiscrimination principle, the law should focus on 
remedying individual harms caused by discriminatory acts.160  Under the 
anti-subordination principle, antidiscrimination law should facilitate the 
types of social change necessary to eliminate group-based inequality.161  
When these principles are in conflict, courts most often abide by the anti-
discrimination principle if doing so would serve members of a protected 
class.  For example, in Starrett City, asked to decide whether a quota system 
that was aimed at maintaining integration was allowable under the Fair 
Housing Act, the court determined that the quota system had a 
discriminatory effect on African Americans.  As described above, because 
there were more African Americans on the waiting list for housing in 
Starrett City, the quota system served to exclude African Americans even 
while it served its integrationist goal.162   
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 Seicshnaydre, supra note 107, at 1183 (describing Professor Samuel R. Bagenstos’ 
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scholarship). 
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 Id. 
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 Starrett was, in many ways, a disparate treatment case, not a disparate impact case, 
however, presumably the same analysis could apply in disparate impact cases—if a neutral 
rule serves to limit housing opportunities for minorities, then such a claim should at least 
be cognizable under the Fair Housing Act. 
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This seems like the right result.  Though the Fair Housing Act’s 
stated purpose to provide “for Fair Housing throughout the United States” is 
a bit vague, it certainly seems that it would be antithetical to our basic 
understanding of “fairness” if the Act served to disadvantage African 
Americans in order to support integration. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Housing segregation and lack of housing opportunities for the 
communities that the Fair Housing Act purports to protect is at the root of 
many of our country’s societal ills, from gaps in educational achievement 
across color lines, to disparities in employment opportunities.  Emphasizing 
the intent behind individual acts, rather than the “cumulative effects of 
government and private decisions on historically disadvantaged 
communities of color, obscures the complex connection between housing 
segregation and many other societal ills.”163 
Interestingly, the Supreme Court increasingly seems frustrated by 
confronting the “branches” of racial inequality that grow from the roots of 
housing segregation—as Justice O’Conner expressed in the affirmative 
action context in Grutter v. Bollinger164, and as was recently affirmed in 
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 Amicus Brief in Mt. Holly, submitted by Howard University School of Law on 
behalf of Empower DC, 26. Citing Kenneth L. Karst, Equal Citizenship at Ground Level: 
The Consequences of Nonstate Action, 54 DUKE L.J. 1591, 1606–07 (2005). 
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Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,165 some on the Supreme Court feel 
that there should be a time limit on remedying our racist past.  The Supreme 
Court seems to have what I term “racial fatigue”—that is, it appears tired of 
litigation related to our racist past, as opposed to what it sees as our race-
neutral present. If the Supreme Court wishes to see fewer cases dealing with 
disparities in education or employment across racial lines, then it must not 
render the Fair Housing Act – the legislation aimed at remedying the roots 
of those problems – impotent.   
While the debate about whether the Fair Housing Act allows for the 
type of race-conscious thinking that is called for in disparate impact 
analysis will likely rage on, when one examines how redevelopment 
decisions are actually made, it becomes clear that a myopic hunt for intent 
may be fruitless.  In the complex and diffuse decision-making process that 
is at the heart of all redevelopment activity, it is the effects of such 
decisions, not the intent behind those decisions, which really matter.  As the 
Supreme Court stated in Jones v. Mayer Co., “when racial discrimination 
herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy property turn on the 
color of their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery.”166 
*** 
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